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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS EMPLOYED THE INCORRECT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The court of appeals has not consistently applied the same standard of review to 
Miranda cases. For example, under one standard, the trial court's factual findings are 
reviewed for clear error while its ultimate legal conclusions are reviewed non-
deferentially for correctness. (Br. of Pet. at 20). Under another standard, the trial court's 
application of the legal standard to the facts is given a measure of discretion. (Br. of 
Resp. at 12). 
The State does not disagree that the court of appeals has applied two different 
standards of review, but argues that "this is irrelevant." (Br. of Resp. at 12). To the 
contrary, the fact that the court of appeals has not consistently applied a uniform standard 
of review to Miranda cases and the fact that there is a need for a consistent, uniform 
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standard of review shows that the split in the court of appeals is highly relevant and 
pertinent to the outcome of this case and future Miranda cases. 
The State asserts that a trial court's ultimate legal conclusion should be afforded 
discretion in Miranda cases "because of the variability of the factual settings" and 
because the trial court is in a better position to observe "facts, such as a witness's 
appearance and demeanor." (Br. of Resp. at 10, 15). There has been much discussion and 
debate regarding standards of review and what amount of discretion, if any, should be 
given to trial courts for ultimate legal conclusions on mixed questions of law and fact. A 
few examples include State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), State v. Pena, 869 
p.2d 932 (Utah 1994), and State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 103 P.3d 699. 
In Thurman, this Court recognized the numerous problems associated with a single 
trial judge's ultimate legal conclusion being afforded discretion. This Court observed 
that "while the trial court is primarily concerned with the proper resolution of factual 
issues under the controlling law, the appellate court addresses itself to the clarity and 
correctness of the developing law in order to provide unambiguous direction to those 
whose further rights and responsibilities are affected." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. The 
Thurman Court adopted a "two-standard" approach for Fourth Amendment consent 
issues which "takes into account the relative functions of the trial and appellate courts 
while ensuring the consistent and uniform protection of a fundamental civil liberty." The 
Court stated: 
On one hand, the application of the clearly erroneous standard to the trial court's 
factual findings recognizes the trial court's advantaged position in judging 
credibility and resolving evidentiary conflicts. On the other hand, the application 
of the correction standard to the trial court's ultimate voluntariness determination 
acknowledges that a single trial judge is in an inferior position to determine what 
the legal content of voluntariness should be and that a panel of appellate judges, 
with their collective experience and their broader perspective, is better suited to 
that task. Also, the decision of the appellate panel is published, thereby providing 
state-wide standards that guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials. 
M a t 1271. 
The Court further explained the reasoning as to why non-deferential review is 
appropriate: 
[T]he concept of "voluntariness" reflects a balance between the need for effective 
law enforcement and society's belief that the coercive powers of law enforcement 
must not be unfairly exercised. Declaring whether certain police conduct is or is 
not unfairly coercive sets the norms that fix the limits of acceptable police 
behavior. There can be little question that establishing such norms involves 
substantive policy judgments and that such norms should have jurisdiction-wide 
application. These are functions classically reserved to multi-judge appellate 
panels. In short, what constitutes unfairly coercive police behavior should not 
vary from courtroom to courtroom within Utah. This end is best accomplished by 
viewing the ultimate conclusion that consent was voluntary or involuntary as a 
question of law, reviewable for correctness. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. 
In Pena, this Court considered the standard of review for reasonable-suspicion 
determinations. In doing so, this Court explained that the standard of review for different 
cases involving different issues varied, giving some legal conclusions broad discretion 
and others very limited, or even de novo review. Pena, 869 P.2d at 938. The Pena Court 
employed the judicial pasture metaphor to show that it was necessary in some instances 
to grant broad discretion to the trial court, and that in other situations, the interest of 
having uniform legal rules and preserving constitutional rights called for a limited or non-
deferential standard of review. Id. at 938-939. 
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The Pena Court concluded that the appropriate standard of review for reasonable 
suspicion determinations is one of non-deference. Pena, 869 P.2d at 939. However, the 
Pena Court then added that the reasonable suspicion legal standard "is one that conveys a 
measure of discretion to the trial judge when applying that standard to a given set of 
facts. Precisely how much discretion we cannot say, but we would not anticipate a close, 
de novo review. On the other hand, a sufficiently careful review is necessary to assure 
that the purposes of the reasonable-suspicion requirement are served.'' Id. 
Thus, under Pena, while the standard of review for reasonable suspicion 
determination is one that is reviewed non-deferentially, appellate courts are to allow 
some amount of discretion to a trial court, but no one can say how much. Levin asserts 
that the progeny of Pena and the unclear amount of deference trial court's are to be given 
has resulted in an inconsistent application of the law - results clearly anticipated and 
warned against in Thurman. 
Recently, this Court distanced itself from the troublesome deferential standard of 
review set forth in Pena and adopted a non-deferential standard of review for Fourth 
Amendment cases in State v. Brake. This Court revisited the judicial pasture metaphor 
utilized in Pena and expounded on the troubles that appellate courts have with giving 
deference to trial courts for mixed questions of law and fact. Brake, 2004 UT 95 at ^[13. 
This Court observed that "[considerations of policy play a central part in the placement 
of discretionary fences." Id. at [^14. For this reason, the Pena Court "singled out as an 
example of this phenomenon our determination to treat without deference trial court 
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rulings involving the legality of consent to a search in State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 
(Utah 1993)." Id. Quoting Pena, this Court further explained: 
[I]n Thurman, we found that while there were varying fact patterns that would be 
relevant to determinations of voluntariness of consent, they were not so 
unmanageable in their variety as to outweigh the interest in having uniform legal 
rules regarding consent to search, given the substantial Fourth Amendment 
interests lost as a result of such consents. 
Id. (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 939). 
Levin asserts that it is equally important to have uniform legal rules regarding 
Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment rights. If the State's position is adopted by 
this Court, then the very concerns expressed in Brake regarding inconsistent application 
of search and seizure law and the loss of substantial Fourth Amendment rights will result 
in inconsistent application of Miranda case law and the loss of substantial Fifth 
Amendment rights. 
The State's position that there are two valid reasons to give deference to a trial 
court's ultimate legal conclusion for Miranda cases does not follow the reasoning set 
forth in both Thurman and Brake. For one, while the fact pattems under Fifth 
Amendment issues can be varying and quite complex, they are no more varying or 
complex than fact patterns under Fourth Amendment issues. In fact, there are numerous 
cases where an officer's conduct results in suppression motions involving both Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment issues. Fourth Amendment issues and their varied fact patterns are 
no different than Fifth Amendment issues and their varied fact patterns. Just because 
Fifth Amendment issues may involve varied fact patterns, "they were not so 
unmanageable in their variety as to outweigh the interest in having uniform legal rules 
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regarding [Miranda issues], given the substantial [Fifth] Amendment interests lost as a 
result of such [custodial interrogations]." See Brake, 2004 UT 95 at [^14 (citations 
omitted). 
Moreover, under the standard of review set forth in Thurman and Brake, a trial 
court's factual findings are already given deference, especially findings regarding a 
witness's credibility or lack thereof. If a defendant's story lacks credibility, the trial court 
makes this finding and appellate courts give this finding deference unless it is clearly 
erroneous. In the interest of having uniform legal standards and uniform application of 
the law, the legal conclusions, not the factual findings, are given non-deferential review. 
The State asserts that the court of appeal's decision in State v. Levin, 2004 UT 
App 396, 101 P.3d 846, correctly found that "the facts to which the legal rule is to be 
applied are so complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance of 
all these facts can be spelled out." (Br. of Appellee at 13, citing Levin, 2004 UT 396 at 
f7). Surely, the facts of this case are not so complicated as to wholly prevent this Court 
from applying the four factors set forth in Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2s 1168 (Utah 
1983), and determining whether Levin was in custody and subjected to interrogation for 
Miranda purposes. Similar fact patterns are presented to Utah district and appellate 
courts almost daily. Utah appellate courts can not hide behind the veil of complexity and 
defer all judgment to trial courts feigning the preposterous assertion that no rule of law 
can be spelled out to sufficiently guide lower courts. The Levin court simply abandoned 
its duty and abdicated its role to the trial court. See Levin, 2004 UT 396 at f s 21-22 
[affording the trial court "considerable discretion" in its ultimate legal conclusion]. 
6 
Furthermore, the State's assertion that the facts of this case are so complex that no 
rule can be formulated to assist trial courts and law officers is misguided and incorrect. 
The facts of this case are not in dispute. The trial court and the appellate court made no 
findings that there were disputed facts. The only fact that the State hints at being 
disputable is the length of time that Levin was detained (Br. of Resp. at 19, note 5). This 
fact, however, is not in dispute since Levin testified that the detention was from 60 to 90 
minutes and deputy Keith testified that he did not think it was more than one hour, "but I 
don't know." (R. 294: 59, 181). Additionally, there was no finding that Levin's 
testimony regarding the detention lacked credibility. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, Order, attached in Br. of Pet. Since there are no factual disputes and no finding 
that Levin's testimony lacked credibility, the assertion that this case is too complex and 
varying to adequately draft a rule to guide lower courts lacks merit.1 
In order to avoid the pitfalls warned against in Thurman resulting in inconsistent 
application of the law, appellate courts must review atrial court's ultimate legal 
conclusion regarding Miranda issues non-deferentially. This will insure published, 
uniform legal rules to guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials. 
II. THE ERROR WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT 
The State asserts that because the court of appeals considered all of the Carrier 
factors, the outcome would have been the same even if non-deferential review was 
applied to the trial court's legal conclusion (Br. of Resp. at 17-18). However, a quick 
1
 Even if there were factual disputes and findings regarding credibility, Levin asserts that the 
standard set forth in Brake adequately affords trial courts substantial discretion in these findings. 
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review of the court of appeal's decision shows that the Carrier factors were not 
adequately considered in conjunction with the totality of the circumstances. 
This discussion was set forth in Levin's original brief and it will only be 
supplemented here. It should be noted that the court of appeals went through each factor 
and determined that each factor in and of itself was insufficient to conclude that Levin 
was in custody. See Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at j^'s 14, 16, 22. The court of appeals then 
made the leap, without considering each factor taken together under the totality of the 
circumstances, and hastily pronounced its conclusion. Id. at ^[23. When considering the 
totality of the circumstances, it is inappropriate to cite conclusory statements from other 
cases without ferreting out the totality of the circumstances that led those courts to make 
the conclusions they did. It is also inappropriate to rely on such conclusory citations 
without considering all the facts of this case and then make the gargantuan leap that since 
the conclusory statements may not in-and-of themselves constitute custody, then Levin 
was not in custody. Had the court of appeals properly cited Berkemer v. McCarty, relied 
on State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996), instead of State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d 
831 (Utah App. 1993), and considered all four Carrier factors together, its conclusion 
would have been different. 
In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), 
the United States Supreme Court stated and the court of appeals quoted that "Traffic 
stops on a public road, even if in a relatively remote location, generally do not create the 
type of situation in which 'the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police.'" 
Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 438; Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at \\A (emphasis added). The 
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Berkemer Court explained, however, that an ordinary traffic stops is "temporary and 
brief lasting "only a few minutes.'" 468 U.S. at 437. The Berkemer Court further 
explained that during ordinary traffic stops, the stop is public with passerby on foot or car 
witness the interaction of officer and motorist. Id. at 438. There is also uonly one or at 
most two policeman" and thus, the atmosphere is not police dominated. Id. 
The stop in this case was no "ordinary traffic stop" considering the length of the 
detention, the remoteness of the location and lack of passerby witnesses, the fact that 
three officers were present and repeatedly questioned Levin regarding drug use, the fact 
that Levin was separated from the other passengers and questioned, and the various field 
sobriety tests conducted. See Br. of Pet. at 30. Accordingly, the site of interrogation was 
police dominated suggesting that Levin was in custody. 
Moreover, State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d 831 (Utah App. 1995), is not applicable 
to the facts of this case. The defendant in Strausberg was questioned by the police in a 
non-accusatory and investigative manner. Id. at 835. Moreover, the questioning 
occurred shortly after the police arrived at the scene. Id. However, in this case, the court 
of appeals found that the questioning by police went beyond investigative in nature, 
focused on Levin, and was accusatory. Levin, 2004 UT 396 at f^l 1. Furthermore, the 
defendant in Strausberg was stopped in front of his father's home, while Levin was 
questioned in a remote location near Utah Lake. Strausberg, 895 P.2d at 835. Thus, the 
totality of the circumstances in Strausberg are strikingly different that the totality of the 
circumstances in this case. 
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Additionally, the court of appeals correctly concluded that Levin was subjected to 
accusatory questioning, although it incorrectly deferred to the trial court's finding that 
this questioning "was not overly accusatory." Levin, 2004 UT 396 at TJ22. As stated in 
the original brief whether or not the questioning was "overly accusatory" is not relevant 
to the inquiry (Br. of Pet. at 33). Levin was subjected to interrogation and was definitely 
in custody since he was detained and not free to leave for at least one hour, while being 
repeatedly questioned by three different officers using various forms of interrogation, all 
taking place in a remote area. 
Furthermore, the evidence linking Levin to the charges without his 
incriminating statements is too attenuated to support a conviction. See Br. of Pet. at 36. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Levin respectfully asks this Court to reverse the court 
of appeal's decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J°[_ day of September 2005. 
MargarefP. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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